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Abstract: Our society greatly depends on services and applications provided
by mobile communication networks. As billions of people and devices become
connected, it becomes increasingly important to guarantee security of interac-
tions of all players. In this talk we address several aspects of this important,
many-folded problem. First, we show how to design cryptographic primitives
which can assure integrity and confidentiality of transmitted messages while
satisfying resource constrains of low-end low-cost wireless devices such as sen-
sors or RFID tags. Second, we describe countermeasures which can enhance
the resistance of hardware implementing cryptographic algorithms to hardware
Trojans.
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1 Introduction
Today minimal or no security is typically provided to low-end low-cost wire-
less devices such as sensors or RFID tags in the conventional belief that
the information they gather is of little concern to attackers. However, case
studies have shown that a compromised sensor can be used as a stepping
stone to mount an attack on a wireless network. For example, in the attack
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described in [1], wireless tire pressure sensors were hacked and used to access
the automotive system.
As the numb r and type of connected d vices grows, so are the secu-
rity risks. Attacks are becoming more frequent and their effect is more
global. The Octob r 21st, 2016, massive distributed denial of service attack
that made inaccessible millions of webpages has shown how vulnerable the
Internet is today. Future wireless networks are expected to support security-
critical services related to industrial automatio , traffic safety, smart trans-
port, smart grid, e-health, etc. The value of the information to which the
low-end devices will have access via future wireless networks is expected to
be much greater than the one today, hence the incentives for attackers will
increase [2]. The damage caused by an individual actor may not be limited
to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety,
national economy, and national security.
Many low-cost wireless devices, such as sensors or Radio Frequency IDen-
tification (RFID) tags, work under severe resource constrains such as limited
battery and computing power, little memory, and insufficient bandwidth.
These devices must dedicate most of their available resources to executing
core application functionality and have little resources left for implementing
security [3]. To satisfy their constrains, it might be advantageous to com-
bine techniques intended to assure high reliability of communication links
(scrambling, checksums, forward error correction (FEC)) with cryptographic
techniques intended to assure security. In Section 2 we show how functional
similarities between error detection and data integrity protection can be ex-
ploited to efficiently combine these two functions in one.
In Section 3, we address another important problem - assuring data confi-
dentiality. For communications over insecure networks, such as the Internet,
data confidentiality is assured by encryption. In recent years, many cases of
successful attacks on networks causing disclosure of private data have been
reported. This increased user privacy concerns. We describe an efficient
encryption algorithm which satisfies resource constrains of low-cost wireless
devices and therefore enables encrypting all traffic and data transmitted
using these devices.
In addition to assuring data integrity and confidentiality, it is equally
important to trust hardware which implements cryptographic algorithms.
If cryptographic hardware has a vulnerability, all the efforts in defending a
system at network or software levels are wasted. For example, malicious al-
terations inserted into an integrated circuit at the design or manufacturing
stage can open backdoors into a system in spite of cryptographic protec-
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Abstract. In an overview of Horizontal Current Bipolar Transistor (HCBT) 
technology, the state-of-the-art integrated silicon bipolar transistors are described 
which exhibit fT and fmax of 51 GHz and 61 GHz and fTBVCEO product of 173 GHzV that 
are among the highest-performance i planted-base, silicon bipolar transistors. HBCT 
is integrated with CMOS in a considerably lower-cost fabrication sequence as 
compared to standard vertical-current bipolar transistors with only 2 or 3 additional 
masks and fewer process steps. Du  to its specific structure, the charge sharing effect 
an be employed to increase BVCEO without sacrificing fT and fmax. Moreover, the 
electric field can be engineered ju t by manipulating the lithography masks achieving 
the high-voltage HCBTs with breakdowns up to 36 V integrated in the same process 
flow with high-speed devices, i.e. at zero additional costs. Double-balanced active 
mixer circuit is designed and fabricated in HCBT technology. The maximum IIP3 of 
17.7 dBm at mixer current of 9.2 A and conversion gain of -5 dB are achieved. 
Key words: BiCMOS technology, Bipolar transistors, Horizontal Current Bipolar 
Transistor, Radio frequency integrated circuits, Mix r, High-voltage 
bipolar transistors. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the highly competitive wireless c mmunication markets, the RF circuits and 
systems are fabricated in the technologies that ar  very cost-sensitive. In order to 
minimize the fabrication costs, the sub-10 GHz applications can be processed by using the 
high-volume silicon technologies. It has be  identified that the optimum solution might 
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described in [1], wireless tire pressure sensors were hacked and used to access
the automotive system.
As the number and type of connected devices grows, so are the secu-
rity risks. Attacks are becoming more frequent and their effect is more
global. The October 21st, 2016, massive distributed denial of service attack
that made inaccessible millions of webpages has shown how vulnerable the
Internet is today. Future wireless networks are expected to support security-
critical services related to industrial automation, traffic safety, smart trans-
port, smart grid, e-health, etc. The value of the information to which the
low-end devices will have access via future wireless networks is expected to
be much greater than the one today, hence the incentives for attackers will
increase [2]. The damage caused by an individual actor may not be limited
to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public safety,
national economy, and national security.
Many low-cost wireless devices, such as sensors or Radio Frequency IDen-
tification (RFID) tags, work under severe resource constrains such as limited
battery and computing power, little memory, and insufficient bandwidth.
These devices must dedicate most of their available resources to executing
core application functionality and have little resources left for implementing
security [3]. To satisfy their constrains, it might be advantageous to com-
bine techniques intended to assure high reliability of communication links
(scrambling, checksums, forward error correction (FEC)) with cryptographic
techniques intended to assure security. In Section 2 we show how functional
similarities between error detection and data integrity protection can be ex-
ploited to efficiently combine these two functions in one.
In Section 3, we address another important problem - assuring data confi-
dentiality. For communications over insecure networks, such as the Internet,
data confidentiality is assured by encryption. In recent years, many cases of
successful attacks on networks causing disclosure of private data have been
reported. This increased user privacy concerns. We describe an efficient
encryption algorithm which satisfies resource constrains of low-cost wireless
devices and therefore enables encrypting all traffic and data transmitted
using these devices.
In addition to assuring data integrity and confidentiality, it is equally
important to trust hardware which implements cryptographic algorithms.
If cryptographic hardware has a vulnerability, all the efforts in defending a
system at network or software levels are wasted. For example, malicious al-
terations inserted into an integrated circuit at the design or manufacturing
stage can open backdoors into a system in spite of cryptographic protec-
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tion. In Section 4, we describe two countermeasures against a type of hard-
ware Trojans which exploit non-zero aliasing probability of Built-In-Self-Test
(BIST).
2 Message Authentication
To authenticate a message means to verify that the message
1. comes from the right sender (its authenticity), and
2. has not been modified (its integrity).
Clearly, data integrity protection can be implemented by using some
n-bit message authentication code, e.g. keyed hash message authentica-
tion code (HMAC) [4] or cipher block chaining message authentication code
(CBC-MAC) [5], on the top of an error-detecting code, e.g. n-bit cyclic re-
dundancy check (CRC). However, such an approach expands the message
by n bits and requires a separate encoding/decoding engine which is more
complex than the CRC encoding/decoding engine.
On the other hand, if we simply replace an n-bit CRC with an n-bit
HMAC or CBC-MAC, we cannot guarantee the detection of the same type
of random errors as the CRC. For example, the detection of n-bit burst
errors cannot be guaranteed. This may have a negative impact on the re-
liability of communication links. Only if we make the conventional CRC
cryptographically secure, can we assure a certain level of security without
sacrificing reliability.
The latter motivated the development of cryptographically secure CRCs.
The core idea is to make the CRC generator polynomial variable and se-
cret. The CRC presented by Krawczyk [6] is based on irreducible generator
polynomials. The approach described in [7] uses a product of irreducible
polynomials. The CRC proposed in [8] uses generator polynomials of type
(1 + x)p(x), where p(x) is a primitive polynomial. In all three cases, testing
for irreducibility or primitivity is required, which is either time or memory
consuming. Selecting an irreducible degree-n polynomial at random requires
either selecting at random a degree-n polynomial (O(n) time) and running a
test for irreducibility (Ω(n3) time [9]), or selecting at random a degree-n poly-
nomial from a database of irreducible degree-n polynomials (roughly 2n/n
space). Note that the irreducibility test has to be done during key agree-
ment, i.e. it incurs delay before the communication can start. Therefore, it
is desirable to minimize the time spent on doing it as much as possible.
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In [10], we presented a cryptographically secure CRC based on any ran-
domly selected generator polynomial, with no requirements on irreducibility.
This eliminates the need for irreducibility tests. It takes only O(n) time to
generate a random polynomial of degree n. The presented cryptographically
secure CRC retains most of the implementation simplicity of the traditional
CRC except that the LFSR implementing the encoding and decoding is
required to have re-programmable connections. Similarly to previously pro-
posed cryptographically secure CRCs, the new one enables combining the
detection of random and malicious errors without increasing bandwidth.
However, using random polynomials as generator polynomials for the
CRC gives an adversary a higher chance of braking authentication. In [10],
we provided a detailed quantitative analysis of the achieved security as a
function of message and CRC lengths and showed that the presented au-
thentication scheme is particularly suitable for short messages. Since short
messages (a few bytes to a few tens of bytes) are expected to be dominant in
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications [11], this message authentica-
tion technique might be quite useful for resource-constrained M2M devices.
3 Encryption
Encryption is the process of transforming a message in such a way that only
authorized parties can understand its content. Encryption assures message
confidentiality.
Encryption can be performed using either a block or a stream cipher.
Block ciphers have been studied for over 50 years [12]. Collected knowledge
about their design and cryptanalysis made it possible to develop the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm which is widely accepted and
has strong resistance against various kind of attacks [13].
On the other hand, an active public investigation of stream ciphers be-
gan only about 20 years ago [14]. A common type of stream cipher is the
binary additive stream cipher, in which the keystream, the plaintext, and the
ciphertext are binary sequences. The keystream is produced by a keystream
generator which takes a secret key and an initial value (IV) as a seed and
generates a pseudo-random sequence of 0s and 1s. The ciphertext is then
obtained by the bit-wise addition of the keystream and the plaintext.
To design a secure stream cipher which satisfies technical requirements of
resource-constrained devices, a best trade-off between area and performance
for a given security level should be sought. Previous stream cipher designs
have either too high propagation delay (e.g. Grain family [15]) or use too
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many flip-flops (e.g. Trivium [16]) for a given security level. Thus, they
optimize only one of the two important parameters - area or performance.
In [17], we presented a methodology for designing a class of stream ciphers,
called Espresso, which takes into account both parameters simultaneously,
thus minimizing the hardware footprint and maximizing the throughput of
the design.
First, by using Non-Linear Feedback Shift Registers (NLFSRs) imple-
mented in the Galois configuration [18,19], feedback functions can be made
smaller. This allows us to reduce the propagation delay compared to Grain
while at the same time decrease the size compared to Trivium. Due to the
large number of feedback functions in Espresso, its maximum degree of par-
allelization cannot be made as high as in both Grain and Trivium. Still, by
carefully choosing feedback functions, we are able to guarantee the maximum
degree of parallelization four and a maximum-length NLFSR.
Second, to enable security analysis of Espresso, we transform the original
Galois NLFSR to an NLFSR whose configuration resembles the Fibonacci
configuration. The core idea of our method is to assure that all of the most
biased linear approximations of the output Boolean function take inputs only
from those stages of the Galois NLFSR which have a corresponding equiva-
lent stage in the transformed NLFSR. As a result, traditional cryptanalysis
techniques can be applied to our design as well.
According to our evaluation, Espresso is the fastest among the ciphers
below 1500 GE, including Grain-128 and Trivium. Its 1-bit per cycle version
has 1497 GE area, 2.22 Gbits/sec throughput and 232 ns latency, meeting
requirements of most applications envisioned today. It is resistant to known
attacks, including linear approximations, algebraic attacks, time-memory-
data trade off attacks, chosen IV attacks, differential attacks and weak key
attacks.
4 Hardware Trojans
A hardware Trojan is a malicious modification of a design that makes it
possible to bypass or disable the security of a system [20]. Hardware Trojans
has been known for a while, but previously it was very difficult to inject a
Trojan into the supply chain. In today’s globalized world in which multiple
players are involved in the supply chain, this is no longer a problem.
Malicious changes can be introduced into a design, for example, by tam-
pering with a CAD-tool which is used for circuit’s synthesis [21]. The code
of a CAD-tool is usually huge and it undergoes a continuous development.
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So, several extra lines which modify the original design to inject a Trojan
may easily get unnoticed in a multi-million line code. Alternatively, a third-
party-made IP-block might contain a backdoor that can be used to steal
secret keys or extract internal chip data. Circuit modifications can also be
made at the manufacturing stage, potentially affecting all chips or just some
selected ones. Today’s chips contain billions of transistors, so it is very dif-
ficult to identify which of them are not a part of the original design [22].
Functional verification is further complicated by the fact that manufactur-
ers are typically given a freedom to add redundant circuitry to a chip in
order to increase manufacturing yield [23].
The presence of hardware Trojans can be difficult to prove. For example,
some PCs are claimed to contain malicious circuit modifications that allow
a person who knows the modifications to remotely access a PC without the
user’s knowledge [24]. However, it is still not confirmed if these claims are
true or not. Some processors are suspected to contain backdoors deliberately
implanted in their hardware Random Number Generators (RNGs) that make
possible predicting RNG’s output [25]. Again, it remains a conspiracy-theory
story.
We do not know if these stores are true or not. However, we cannot
discount a possibility that such attacks may take place if they are feasible
to implement. For example, as demonstrated in [26], it is possible to reduce
the security of a hardware RNG compliant with FIPS 140-2 [27] and NIST
SP800-90 [28] standards from 128 to 32 bits by injecting stuck-at faults at the
outputs of selected transistors. This can be done without disabling the BIST
logic which checks RNG’s functionality at each power-up, without failing
BIST tests, and without failing any randomness tests. Stuck-at faults can be
injected a very stealthy way by modifying dopant types in the active region of
transistors. Such dopant-level Trojans do not require adding any extra logic
to the original design and therefore do not change its layout. As a result, the
Trojan-injected circuit appears legitimate at all wiring layers. Even with the
advanced imaging methods such as Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) or
Focused Ion Beam (FIB), it extremely difficult to detect changes made to the
dopant in a large design implemented with nanoscale technologies. To detect
changes in dopant types, in addition to all metal layers, the contact layer has
to be examined. High-quality imaging of the contact layer is significantly
more costly than imaging of a metal layer [29]. In addition, since only the
dopants of a few transistors are modified, the change in the side-channel
information is too small to be detected by side-channel analysis. Typically
side-channel analysis can only detect sufficiently large Trojans that are at
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implanted in their hardware Random Number Generators (RNGs) that make
possible predicting RNG’s output [25]. Again, it remains a conspiracy-theory
story.
We do not know if these stores are true or not. However, we cannot
discount a possibility that such attacks may take place if they are feasible
to implement. For example, as demonstrated in [26], it is possible to reduce
the security of a hardware RNG compliant with FIPS 140-2 [27] and NIST
SP800-90 [28] standards from 128 to 32 bits by injecting stuck-at faults at the
outputs of selected transistors. This can be done without disabling the BIST
logic which checks RNG’s functionality at each power-up, without failing
BIST tests, and without failing any randomness tests. Stuck-at faults can be
injected a very stealthy way by modifying dopant types in the active region of
transistors. Such dopant-level Trojans do not require adding any extra logic
to the original design and therefore do not change its layout. As a result, the
Trojan-injected circuit appears legitimate at all wiring layers. Even with the
advanced imaging methods such as Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) or
Focused Ion Beam (FIB), it extremely difficult to detect changes made to the
dopant in a large design implemented with nanoscale technologies. To detect
changes in dopant types, in addition to all metal layers, the contact layer has
to be examined. High-quality imaging of the contact layer is significantly
more costly than imaging of a metal layer [29]. In addition, since only the
dopants of a few transistors are modified, the change in the side-channel
information is too small to be detected by side-channel analysis. Typically
side-channel analysis can only detect sufficiently large Trojans that are at
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most three to four orders of magnitude smaller than the original design [30].
Trojans of a smaller size remain undetected.
The attack presented in [26] exploits the fact that aliasing probability of
BIST is non-zero due to the compaction of circuit’s output responses. Alias-
ing probability is the probability that a fault-free circuit is not distinguished
from a faulty one. If an n-bit compactor is used, the aliasing probability of
BIST is 1/2n [31]. In the traditional BIST, the same set of test patterns
is applied to a circuit under test at each test cycle, and therefore the same
compacted output response, called signature, is expected. Therefore, an ad-
versary who knows the set of BIST test patterns can select suitable values
for the Trojan that result in the same signature as a fault-free circuit signa-
ture. Since the aliasing probability is 1/2n, in order to inject a Trojan which
does not trigger BIST, an adversary has to make 2n−1 simulation trials on
average. The typical size of a BIST output response compactor is 32 bits,
so the attack is feasible in practice.
In [32,33], we presented two methods for modifying BIST to prevent such
an attack. In the first method, we make the BIST test patterns dependent
on a configurable key which is programed into a chip after the manufactur-
ing stage. In the second method, we use a remote test management system
which has sufficient computational resources to execute BIST using a differ-
ent set of test patterns at each test cycle. In both cases, the manufacturer
does not have BIST test patterns and thus does not know which circuit
modifications produce the same signature as a fault-free circuit. Depending
on the application requirements, the former approach might be preferable to
the latter, or vice versa. For example, the latter countermeasure might be
preferable for the Internet of Things applications with constrained resources,
e.g. M2M communications, since it removes some of the BIST functionality
from a device under test rather than adds an extra key to it.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We described message authentication and encryption algorithms which can
assure data integrity and confidentiality while satisfying technical require-
ments of resource-constrained devices. We also showed how to design coun-
termeasures which can enhance the resistance of hardware implementing
cryptographic algorithms to a type of hardware Trojans which exploit non-
zero aliasing probability of BIST.
The presented message authentication approach seems a good candidate
for simpler 5G radio types, such as the ones used for direct communica-
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tion in sensor networks, and use cases with constrained resources such as
M2M. Future work includes evaluating the impact on bandwidth. In the
current wireless standard message formats two separate fields are typically
used for the protection against random and malicious errors. These fields
may be located on different layers, e.g. in LTE the CRC is located at the
physical (PHY) layer while the message authentication code is located at
the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer. A good strategy might
be to combine these two fields into the one at the PHY layer and use the a
cryptographic CRC for the protection against both types of errors. However,
implications for security and coverage caused by such a merge need to be
investigated.
The presented stream cipher Espresso has 128-bit security. We are cur-
rently extending it to 256-bit security, in order to meet the requirements of
post-quantum cryptography. We also consider integrating encryption and
authentication within Espresso.
Regarding hardware Trojans, there is no ”silver bullet” method that can
protect against all possible types of Trojans or other attacks. In parallel with
new countermeasures, more complex attacks are being developed. Moreover,
we are dealing with a two-ended stick - a method originally designed as a
countermeasure can be later turned into an attack, and vice versa. For
example, advanced visual inspection methods for Trojan detection can be
used by IP thefts to reverse-engineer chips. Similarly, if side-channel analysis
techniques for detecting Trojans that affect only a tiny fraction of a design
are invented, they are likely to give rise to more effective side-channel attacks.
Future work remains investigating if there are attacks which can go around
the presented countermeasures and what can be done to avoid them.
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